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Abstract: Encrypted database systems provide a great
method for protecting sensitive data in untrusted infras-
tructures. These systems are built using either special-
purpose cryptographic algorithms that support opera-
tions over encrypted data, or by leveraging trusted com-
puting co-processors. Strong cryptographic algorithms
(e.g., public-key encryptions, garbled circuits) usually
result in high performance overheads, while weaker algo-
rithms (e.g., order-preserving encryption) result in large
leakage profiles. On the other hand, some encrypted
database systems (e.g., Cipherbase, TrustedDB) lever-
age non-standard trusted computing devices, and are
designed to work around the architectural limitations
of the specific devices used.
In this work we build StealthDB – an encrypted
database system from Intel SGX. Our system can run
on any newer generation Intel CPU. StealthDB has
a very small trusted computing base, scales to large
transactional workloads, requires minor DBMS changes,
and provides a relatively strong security guarantees at
steady state and during query execution. Our prototype
on top of Postgres supports the full TPC-C benchmark
with a 30% decrease in the average throughput over an
unmodified version of Postgres operating on a 2GB un-
encrypted dataset.
Keywords: Encrypted databases, Intel SGX
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, storing and processing of enter-
prise data for a lot of companies has moved from the
company’s data center to third party public cloud in-
frastructure or service providers like AWS, Microsoft
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Azure and Google Cloud. These infrastructures are op-
erated and maintained by potentially untrusted oper-
ators. Also, the infrastructure is shared between nu-
merous clients. For instance, a single AWS physical
instance may co-locate a number of virtual client in-
stances. Given these features, protecting the confiden-
tiality and integrity of user’s data from administrators,
co-tenants, and other attackers is a major challenge.
To tackle this problem, research has been done to
build “encryption-in-use” mechanisms that greatly im-
prove security by preventing the attackers and even the
cloud operators from ever seeing the data in clear. A
lot of work has been done on improving the security
and performance on a subset of SQL operations as sys-
tematized in the survey by [22], but only a handful of
systems are complete and evaluated at scale. The state
of art encryption-in-use database systems which have
been evaluated at scale can be divided into two main
categories:
(A) systems built using advanced encryption schemes
that allow to perform operations over the cipher-
texts [45–47], and
(B) systems that leverage a trusted processing device
(e.g., FPGA, IBM secure co-processor) to perform
operations [2, 4, 18].
A practical encrypted database design is evaluated in
terms of the following four aspects:
– security: leakage profile and security assumptions.
Leakage profile characterizes the amount of data
leakage introduced by the design. Security assump-
tions include the mathematical assumptions for
the cryptography and the trusted computing base
(TCB) and other trust assumptions for the trusted
hardware.
– functionality: the SQL operations and DBMS func-
tions supported.
– performance: throughput, latency and scalability to
large datasets.
– intrusiveness level: amount of changes to the under-
lying DBMS.
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CryptDB [47] is a seminal work in this area us-
ing property-preserving encryption schemes to execute
queries over encrypted data. But, these schemes do
not offer strong security and when used in multiple
columns they are found to leak extensive information
for real-world datasets [29, 41]. Also, [47] requires ex-
tensive computations (re-encryption of entire columns)
on a trusted proxy or the client to support all the
SQL queries. The other systems using advanced encryp-
tion schemes either have a very limited functionality
[11, 34, 45] or incur heavy computational and storage
overheads [46].
Cipherbase [2] offers a scalable design for transac-
tional workloads with a strong leakage profile and com-
plete SQL support, by leveraging on trusted hardware.
But, the system uses FPGAs as its trusted hardware
and hence has the following security implications: (i) an
initial trusted and on-premise key loading phase is re-
quired for every FPGA device used, (ii) a huge trust is
placed on the FPGA“shell” layer [1] implemented by the
cloud operators which monitors the user operations on
the FPGA to ensure the safety of the device. As such,
significant research is required to use FPGAs as trusted
hardware in cloud-based applications. The other trusted
hardware based systems [4, 18] offer improved leakage
profile but only at the cost of extensive DBMS changes,
much larger TCB and huge performance overheads for
large transactional workloads.
In this work, we study how to build an encrypted
database system from a standard CPU leveraging the
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) instruction
set [39]. SGX enables the creation of a small encrypted
memory container (enclave) that can be accessed only
by a predefined trusted code. The content of the enclave
is protected from untrusted applications and even the
system administrators, OS and hypervisor. Also, SGX
is available in all the recent and future releases of In-
tel CPUs. Hence, SGX offers a great direction for pro-
tecting applications in cloud environments. But, SGX
has its own set of restrictions. It requires rewriting of
applications by partitioning code into trusted and un-
trusted segments. Also, there is a 90 MB bound on “se-
cure” memory to run the trusted enclave code, which
is not nearly enough for even medium size database
workloads.1 Additionally, SGX is vulnerable to mem-
ory, cache and other side-channel leakages, lacks syscalls
and IO support, and incurs high overheads for switching
between enclave and non-enclave modes, which further
limit the complexity and functionality of the trusted
enclave code. As such, one cannot take a DBMS sys-
tem and naively try to “run it in an enclave”. But, it
is important for an encrypted database design to get
around these limitations without having to make ex-
tensive changes to the underlying DBMS, while still
achieving the performance, security and functionality
goals. Also, it is not clear whether a design that works
well for another trusted hardware can be ported to
SGX while preserving the end-to-end security guaran-
tees, since each hardware has its unique set of security
and usability requirements.
1.1 Our contributions
Design choices with SGX
We first investigate three possible design choices for an
encrypted database with SGX in Section 4.2 by varying
the DBMS components run inside an enclave. Through a
set of benchmarking experiments, we identify a design
that works best for our design goals (Section 5). We
develop on that to get the StealthDB design.
StealthDB
The StealthDB system provides a complete SQL sup-
port, strong end-to-end security guarantees and perfor-
mance with minimal changes to the underlying DBMS.
A high-level overview of our system is presented in Fig-
ure 1. StealthDB uses AES-CTR, a semantically secure
encryption scheme to encrypt all the data items in the
database. During query execution, the client encrypts
the query string and sends the ciphertext to the server.
We implement a query parser inside an enclave, which
first decrypts the ciphertext to get the query and parses
the query to output a version with all the constants en-
crypted. For example, when a client sends ENC(select
* from item where name = ‘John’), it is converted to
select * from item where name = ‘ENC(John)’ by our en-
clave parser. To support queries of this form, we define
1 Although various SGX extensions are promised by Intel in
future releases with larger secure memory, they are not available
in the market yet and unclear when they will be. We also argue in
the paper that these extensions should not affect our conclusions
on the architecture of an encrypted DBMS with SGX.
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encrypted datatypes and implement the operators over
these datatypes inside an enclave. We make the oper-
ators data-oblivious [42] to protect against SGX side-
channel attacks. We also encrypt the index file pages
before they are written to disk. These changes are not
intrusive and hence enable StealthDB inherit the func-
tionality of the underlying DBMS completely.
Security
StealthDB offers a stronger leakage profile compared to
the prior complete encrypted database systems. A snap-
shot adversary [5, 8, 16, 23, 50] learns only the “shape”
of the database which includes the dimensions of the
data structures maintained by the DBMS, along the
recently collected query log information. An adversary
with persistent access to memory and disk learns the in-
equalities (<, >, =) between the encrypted values in the
indexes which are compared during the query execution,
along with the query access pattern which includes the
position of the result records in the database. In gen-
eral, the enclave code can be thought of as providing
a black-box access to the DBMS to perform the com-
putations on encrypted data values and obtain the out-
put (encrypted or unencrypted depending on the spec-
ification), without leaking any other information about
the input data values. We explain our leakage profile
in more detail in Section 6, and this profile matches
the state-of-art (the strongest version in [2]) when pro-
viding either reasonable performance2 or intrusiveness
levels for large transactional workloads. Also, our TCB
just includes the processor, the enclave code along with
the SGX hardware and the attestation procedure. Our
clients use the SGX attestation procedure to attest the
correctness of the enclave code before issuing queries.
This combined with the simplicity of the enclave code
reduces the trust to be placed on the enclave code.
Evaluation
We implement our design on top of an existing Post-
gres DBMS. Our new encrypted datatypes and the cor-
responding UDFs are added as extensions in Poste-
gres [48]. The only component that needs modifying
the Postgres code is to encrypt/decrypt the index files
2 From our experience talking to the industry on the possible
adoption of StealthDB, 50% to 2× overhead in performance is a
reasonable penalty for the benefit of security against untrusted
cloud operators.
Fig. 1. High-level architecture overview of StealthDB
when they are stored to/accessed from disk and this
just needs a three lines change in the Postgres codebase.
None of these changes are intrusive, or specific to Post-
gres. Hence, this design principle lets StealthDB ben-
efit directly from any performance or feature improve-
ments to the underlying DBMS engine. Performance-
wise, StealthDB scales to large datasets with a similar
complexity to an unmodified DBMS engine working on
unencrypted data, adding only a tiny overhead for each
query. Our evaluation results in Section 7 show that the
system can process OLTP queries with a 30% reduc-
tion in throughput and ≈ 1 ms overhead in latency over
an unencrypted DBMS with > 10M total rows (or 2
GB plaintext) of a TPC-C warehouse database for scale
factor W = 16.
2 Background on Intel SGX
In this section we give a brief introduction to Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX). We refer the reader
to [14, 39] for more details on SGX. Intel SGX is a set of
new x86 instructions that enable code isolation within
virtual containers called enclaves. In the SGX architec-
ture, developers are responsible for partitioning the ap-
plication into enclave code and untrusted code, and to
define an appropriate I/O communications interface be-
tween them. In SGX, security is bootstrapped from an
underlying trusted processor, but not trust in a remote
software stack. On the high level, the SGX hardware
presents the following two functionalities to a user:
– Load(P)→ (EP, φ): creates an enclave with an iden-
tifier EP and loads the program P into it. It then
produces a proof φ that the intended program P
(and initial data) has been loaded into the enclave.
StealthDB 4
– Execute(EP, input)→ (out, ψ): given an enclave han-
dle EP (corresponding to an enclave with a program
P), Execute runs it on an input input and produces a
tuple constituting of the output out and a proof ψ.
A client can use ψ to verify that out was produced
by the enclave EP executing with input.
There are three main functionalities that enclaves
achieve: isolation, sealing and attestation. We provide
a high-level description here. Please refer to [14, 20] for
more detailed and formal descriptions.
Isolation: code and data inside the enclave protected
memory cannot be read/modified by any process exter-
nal to the enclave.
Sealing: data passed to the host environment is
encrypted and authenticated with a Seal Key that is
specific to the enclave identity and derived from a
hardware-resident Root Seal Key. SGX uses AES-GCM
to encrypt msg using the Seal key of the enclave calling
the function.
Attestation: a special signing key and instructions
are used to provide an unforgeable report attesting to
code, static data, and (hardware-specific) metadata of
an enclave, as well as outputs of computations per-
formed inside the enclave. There are two forms of at-
testation: local and remote.
– Local attestation. An enclave A uses local attestation
procedure to generate a report and attest to another
enclave B on the same platform.
– Remote attestation. Remote attestation procedure
generates a report specific to an enclave called quote
that can be verified by any remote party.
Key establishment during attestation. Key establish-
ment between two enclaves or between an enclave and
a remote party can be accomplished on top of the lo-
cal/remote attestation process. An enclave can send the
key shares (for eg., a Diffie-Hellman key share ga) and
include them as the additional authentication data to
MAC. Thus attestation provides authenticity and in-
tegrity to the key share from the enclave. In our sys-
tem, we will very often run the key establishment phase
on top of local/remote attestation to establish a secure
channel for communication between two enclaves or be-
tween an enclave and a remote party using the estab-
lished shared secret key.
SGX TCB. SGX stands out in that its TCB consists
only of the CPU microcode and privileged containers,
however it also requires the user to trust in Intel’s key
management infrastructure for signing microcode and
various service enclaves. In particular, we must trust
that the root seal keys embedded into devices are not
leaked from the manufacturing facility, and that the In-
tel Provisioning Server safely manages root provisioning
keys as well as other master secret keys.
Although SGX prevents an adversary from directly
inspecting/tampering with the contents of the EPC, it
does not protect against multiple software-based side
channels. Correspondingly, the literature has demon-
strated attacks that extract sensitive data through hard-
ware resource pressure (e.g., cache [7, 9, 15, 52], thread
scheduling [54] and branch predictor [37]) and the ap-
plication’s page-level access pattern [55]. Many of these
works also provide fixes for their attacks with varying
overheads and need to be patched by Intel. For the ap-
plication’s page-level access pattern though, it is up to
the application developer to design data-independent
memory accesses for the data to be secure.
3 Platform Overview
3.1 Usage Model.
We work with the following setting. A data owner aims
to store and process data securely on a remote untrusted
SQL database server. She authorizes clients by issuing
them credentials, and wants to support the authorized
clients to issue queries to the server. The server main-
tains a credential database for the authorized clients
in an encrypted form. Each client authenticates to the
server using its credentials, which will enable the client
to issue its permitted queries to the database. The
server in our model is equipped with a secure proces-
sor, such as Intel SGX. Hence, the server can be identi-
fied with some “platform-key” established by Intel SGX.
The data owner and clients engage in the attestation of
SGX enclaves in the server and on successful attesta-
tions, transfer any secret or sensitive material (master
key, credentials, queries, etc.) to those enclaves via se-
cure channels.
3.2 Threat Model
StealthDB provides security against passive adversaries.
A passive adversary does not inject malicious code or al-
ter the program execution in any way. But, it can read
the contents of the memory, disk and all the communi-
cation, and hence may passively attempt to learn addi-
tional information from the data they observe.
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There are two dimensions in which we analyze the
threat model for our system. The first dimension is
about the extent of access: adversaries restricted to
monitoring the disk accesses versus the adversaries mon-
itoring both the memory and disk accesses in the sys-
tem. The second dimension is about the duration: adver-
saries getting snapshot accesses to memory or disk ver-
sus the much stronger ones which get persistent access
to memory and disk. A snapshot attack might be due
to a memory dump or some cold-boot attack by a ma-
licious cloud provider or by a co-located client running
on the same cloud server as the victim process which
gets occasional access to the memory of the entire sys-
tem due to access control bugs. SQL injection attacks
[16, 17, 31], VM attack leaks [5, 8, 23, 50], disk theft
and a “smash-and-grab” after a full system compromise
[16] are some real-world examples of snapshot attacks
[30].
4 Designing an Encrypted DB
In this section, we describe a few design goals we set
out to achieve for our system. Then, we discuss and
experiment with a few possible design choices possible
when building an encrypted database from SGX.
4.1 Design Goals
The focus of StealthDB is on building a scalable en-
crypted database system that can support arbitrary
query types, with a reasonable leakage. Construction of
an encrypted DBMS with a complete SQL support un-
der any meaningful notion of security is an uphill task in
this world where the proposed attacks [28–30, 35] com-
pletely dismantle the security of even the constructions
with limited functionality (like searchable encryption)
which had, what was thought to be, minimal leakage
(reveal just the locations of the results of each query).
There has been extensive research to secure subsets of
SQL operations [22], but a proposal can be included
in a real world DBMS only if it is compatible with or
provides a complete support of the DBMS tasks. For
instance, the CryptDB design was part of or inspired
many real-world systems [26, 27, 40, 47] due to an al-
most complete DBMS support. In this regard, we set
our design goals as follows:
– Functionality goal: complete support to the SQL
functionality of the underlying DBMS.
– Non-intrusiveness goal: minor modifications to the
core DBMS operations of the underlying DBMS, for
the encrypted database to retain the DBMS prop-
erties. If the underlying DBMS is ACID compliant,
supports triggers and stored procedures, so should
the encrypted database.
– Performance goal: high throughput and low latency
when scaling to large datasets.
– Security goal: We will start by stating the security
goals informally:
– a snapshot adversary on both memory and disk
should learn no information about the individ-
ual data items.
– a persistent adversary on both memory and disk
learns no information about the encrypted data
that are not compared when the queries are pro-
cessed, other than that they are not part of
the query processing. Even for the data of the
query execution, the leakage should match or
be stronger than the previous works supporting
complete SQL.
We will later study the security for each pro-
posed design. And, the leakage profile of the chosen
StealthDB design will be detailed in Section 6.
There is an inherent trade-off here between security
and performance which will influence our design choices.
There is a lower bound of logarithmic overhead in per-
formance [12, 25], just to support encrypted search with-
out any leakage. This also translates to the trade-off
between efficiency and the information leakage during
the index building and usage. Moreover, we also aim
to design secure versions of arithmetic and other oper-
ators to support SQL completely. Hence in this work,
we lean towards achieving a good performance for large
transactional workloads, while trying to achieve the best
security possible for that performance.
4.2 Designing an Encrypted DB from SGX
We consider three design choices and evaluate them on
a few micro experiments to help us understand how to
build an encrypted database system with SGX. The de-
sign choices are summarized in Figure 2. We envision
that in all three design choices data is encrypted on disk
using a semantically secure encryption scheme. The de-
signs differ in how queries are executed over the data.
The first, most obvious design would be to run the
entire DBMS inside an enclave (left figure in 2). The
data would be read from disk, decrypted transparently
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Fig. 2. Three alternative design choices for an encrypted database with SGX.
and then the DBMS would perform all necessary opera-
tions inside an enclave. However, SGX is not well suited
for this task for a few reasons that we outlined ear-
lier. The first issue is that SGX does not support IO or
syscalls, so an additional outside shim layer would need
to be exposed to talk to the kernel level, and the appli-
cation dependencies need to be loaded inside (or outside
via shim) an enclave. It is feasible to get around this is-
sue using recent works such as Haven [6], Scone [3] and
Graphene [13, 53]. They initiate the research in loading
unmodified executables into enclaves. The second issue
is that SGX is currently limited to 90 MB of working
memory and significant penalties appear when going be-
yond that limit [43]. Future releases of SGX promise
larger enclave sizes. However, the Merkle tree integrity
protection for each memory page to prevent replay at-
tacks does not scale well to larger enclaves. These two
issues would result in heavy performance overheads on
transactional workloads for this design.3 But, this de-
sign can have better confidentiality guarantees when the
SGX-based side-channels are addressed.
The second design we consider (middle figure in 2)
keeps most of the DBMS in the untrusted zone. How-
ever, it places the query execution logic in the enclave.
That is, when a query needs to be executed, individ-
ual tables can be brought in to the enclave to perform
selections, projections, joins, etc. The query plan, I/O
and other DBMS parts remain in the untrusted mem-
ory. In terms of scalability, this design suffers from the
same problems as the previous choice due to limited se-
cure memory. Also, tables and indexes need to be read
from disk, deserialized and then loaded into enclave. In
Figure 3 we show that the performance overhead for
performing just this step (read and deserialize) inside
an enclave is around 3× when the dataset fits within an
enclave, and goes up to 9× for large datasets. In terms
3 We do not do a direct performance evaluation for this de-
sign, but the design that we discuss next which runs much less
operations inside an enclave already has high overheads.
of security, the query processing logic would still need
to do the non-trivial task of addressing the SGX side-
channels. Finally, partitioning a DBMS to support this
architecture is also a challenging task.
Fig. 3. Initialization time comparing in memory and in enclave
deserialization for different dataset sizes.
In the third design, we keep most of the DBMS in
the untrusted zone, and the dataset would reside in the
untrusted memory with the data items encrypted indi-
vidually. At the lowest level of the parsed query tree,
each query is eventually broken down into some primi-
tive operators (e.g., <=, >=,+, ∗) over individual data
values. To perform operations over encrypted data in
this design, we transfer individual data item(s) to an
enclave, followed by the decryption of input, the op-
erator function and the encryption of output inside the
enclave. The advantage of this design is that the commu-
nication with the disk and network layers would remain
unchanged. Overall, minimal changes to the DBMS are
needed – one only needs to change how primitive oper-
ators on data values are performed. Also, the amount
of code/data inside an enclave will remain a very small
constant. This keeps the TCB very small, and it is easy
to make it data-oblivious. Hence, we build on this design
idea in Section 5. However, this design leaks relationship
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Fig. 4. Latency to execute random binary tree searches comparing
different approaches. Two different implementations of the partial
approach: comparison function as trusted ecalls and the exit-
less communication via a queue for transferring data to/from an
enclave.
between encrypted data values during query execution
in this design as discussed in Section 6.
In Figure 4, we compare performance of perform-
ing B-tree searches over database indexes in later two
design choices. As expected, one can see that perform-
ing a search when an entire B-tree is loaded inside an
enclave does not scale to larger datasets. (However, it
performs well when the tree size is very small and can
be fit entirely into an enclave.) In the third design, when
the B-tree is kept encrypted in the untrusted memory
but individual comparisons are executed in an enclave,
we see up to 100× overheads compared to performing
the search over unencrypted data. This can be explained
by high switching costs for ecall/ocall functions, which
are used for enclave entry/exit. Using an exit-less com-
munication mechanism via a shared queue [43], we can
reduce this overhead by 5×−10×.
5 Architecture
The architecture of StealthDB is presented in Figure
5. As discussed in our third design, StealthDB makes
minimal changes to the underlying DBMS, with most
of our components augmented on top of an unmodified
DBMS. We will now go through the flow of database
creation and query life-cycle, and explain each of our
components in detail as needed.
5.1 Database creation
When a database is created, the database owner de-
signs a database schema to define the structure of the
database. During the schema creation, StealthDB allows
the owner to identify the columns of the tables in the
database which have sensitive information and use our
encrypted datatypes for those columns. An encrypted
datatype is used to represent values which are the en-
crypted versions of its corresponding plaintext datatype.
For instance, encrypted integers are represented by the
encrypted datatype enc_int4.
Fig. 6. Definition of enc_int4
And, a database owner can issue the following com-
mand to create a table item with two columns of types
encrypted integers and encrypted strings:
StealthDB will encrypt the data values in an en-
crypted datatype using AES-CTR which is an encryp-
tion scheme providing confidentiality of the data values.
We will discuss about the key(s) used by this encryption
during the DBMS initialization.
5.2 DBMS Initialization
When the DBMS is started, the following additional
steps are performed for StealthDB.
Enclaves creation
StealthDB creates three enclaves on the database server:
the client authentication enclave Auth, the query pre-
processing enclave PreProcessor and the operation en-
clave Ops. These enclaves are loaded by an untrusted
DBMS runtime, but our system will later allow to attest
that the correct code has been loaded into the enclaves.
The clients use the remote attestation process and the
publicly available measurements (hash) of the enclave
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Fig. 5. StealthDB architecture. The life cycle of a query initiating from a client can be traced from steps 1 to 5. The lines with shaded
arrows represent encrypted communication between those entities.
code to ensure the correctness of the loaded programs
in the enclaves. We will defer the explanation of this step
and the functionality of these enclaves to the sections
below.
To facilitate the communication between the users
and the enclaves, StealthDB introduces an I/O layer on
the server side. Its job is to simply redirect requests be-
tween the appropriate enclaves and the DBMS. This will
also act as the wrapper program for the enclaves help-
ing in processing their I/O requests and system calls.
Note that this layer is outside the SGX TCB, hence it
is untrusted and can be controlled by an adversary.
Key generation
The initialization phase also involves generating a mas-
ter secret key. StealthDB performs key generation inside
the Auth enclave. Auth runs the KeyGen() function to
sample a 128 bit secret key K at random for the AES en-
cryption/decryption operations. In the current design,
this master key K will be used to encrypt all the data
values in the database. We do this for simplicity and our
design can be extended to support an integration with a
key management service to enable the usage of different
keys for different clients or for different columns in the
database.
Figure 7 outlines the key generation and transfer
procedures. The master key K is then transferred to the
PreProcessor and the Ops enclaves as follows. When the
PreProcessor and Ops enclaves are created, they individ-
ually perform a local attestation with Auth and estab-
lish a secure channel with Auth. When the attestations
succeed and after the secure channels are established,
Auth’s KeyTransfer() function uses the channels to send
the master key K to PreProcessor and Ops. (On the other
end, PreProcessor and Ops will run their KeyReceive()
functions to complete these steps and receive K). On
obtaining K, PreProcessor and Ops use SGX’s sealing
property to encrypt and store K for future use.
Transfer of credentials
The final task of the initialization phase involves trans-
ferring the client credentials and access policies to Auth.
A client (proxy) will authenticate to Auth. And, from the
point of view of the DBMS, Auth (and PreProcessor) will
act as a client who has complete access to the database.
To facilitate this, the data owner first engages in a re-
mote attestation protocol with Auth along with a secure
channel establishment and if it succeeds, she sends the
master credentials along with the database of client cre-
dentials and access policies to Auth through the estab-
lished channel. On obtaining these, Auth uses the SGX
seal operation to encrypt and store them.
5.3 Client authentication
One of the challenges we need to address is to make sure
that only the authorized users can query the encrypted
database system. For this, we design an authentication
method built on top of an existing DBMS.
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Fig. 7. The authentication protocol of StealthDB
After the database server is started, it is now ready
to accept connections from the clients. Here, StealthDB
adds an authentication mechanism for the clients to au-
thenticate to the Auth enclave. This works as follows.
First, the client proxy verifies that the DBMS has
loaded the correct code into Auth, by performing the
remote attestation (plus secure channel establishment)
protocol with Auth as described in Section 2. Let sessk
be the shared secret key obtained after its successful
completion. The client will then authenticate to the
Auth enclave using its credentials, say its password or
its SSH key, through the established secure channel. On
the server side, the I/O layer directs the client authen-
tication requests to the CompleteClientAuth() function
in Auth. CompleteClientAuth() unseals the client creden-
tials database and uses it to verify the client credentials.
If the client authentication completes successfully, the
shared secret key sessk will be used as the session key
for the client.
Once the client authentication is completed, the in-
teraction with the client for query processing will be
performed by the PreProcessor enclave. To facilitate this,
the I/O layer will now invoke the TokenTransfer(ID, sessk)
function in Auth to transfer the client “ID” and sessk to
PreProcessor. This transfer will use the secure channel
established between these enclaves during the master
key transfer.
5.4 Query execution
Now we will explain the working of query processing and
execution in StealthDB for a client which has completed
its authentication successfully. The design of StealthDB
permits the use of an unmodified query driver (e.g.
JDBC, ODBC, etc.).
When a client issues a query, the client proxy en-
crypts the entire query string using the session key
sessk with its ID included in the additional authenti-
cated data. On the server side, the I/O layer directs the
client queries to PreProcessor. The QueryPreProcessing
function first decrypts the query ciphertext using the
session key sessk for ID. Then, it checks whether this
client is permitted to run this query. Typically, a DBMS
allows the DB owners to specify access control poli-
cies for the clients. In StealthDB, we rewrite the ac-
cess control monitor inside PreProcessor. If the checks
are passed, QueryPreProcessing identifies the data val-
ues in the query which correspond to the columns in
the database using encrypted datatypes using our query
parser, and AES-encrypts these data values using the
master secret key K. The output of this step, encquery,
is given to the DBMS for execution.
Note that the DBMS is oblivious to the changes
made to the query. The structure of encquery is same
as that of the query issued by the client. This lets the
DBMS use an unmodified query parser to parse this
query. But after the query is parsed and a query plan is
obtained, we need to augment the DBMS with functions
to operate on the encrypted datatypes. We do this as
follows.
We first identify the set of primitive operators used
by the underlying DBMS. Primitive operators are those
further-indivisible operators used in query plans:
– Arithmetic operators such as +,−,%, ∗, etc.
– Relational operators such as <,>,<=, >=, <>, etc.
– Logical operators such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.
– Hash functions that are used to build some indexes.
– Advanced math functions such as sin, cos, tan, etc.
Traditionally, DBMSs define a functionality for each
input datatype tuple supported by a primitive opera-
tor. StealthDB augments these with their functionalities
when used with the corresponding encrypted datatypes
as in Figure 8. Our implementation on Postgres im-
plements primitive operator functionalities over the en-
crypted datatypes and include them as extensions.
For every possible input datatype tuple, we define
a function inside the Ops enclave. Suppose that we are
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Fig. 8. Operator = for enc_int4. Here, enc_int4_eq will call the
Ops enclave to decrypt the input, check their equality and output
the result.
given two encrypted data values (e1, e2) and an operator
⊕, the corresponding function inside Ops will perform:
1. decryption of the inputs e1, e2 using the master key
to get plaintext values p1, p2,
2. perform the operator function to get pout = p1 ⊕ p2,
3. encrypt the result pout to get a ciphertext eout using
the master key (if specified by the design).
The number of inputs and outputs may of course vary
depending on operator. Moreover, datatype conversions
are also allowed in our model. For example, an en-
crypted integer may be converted to an encrypted
string, and so on. Overall, we only perform a few basic
operations (decrypt, primitive operator, encrypt) dur-
ing the query execution inside the enclave.
Finally, once the final result of the query is obtained,
PreProcessor re-encrypts the results using the session key
sessk and send them back to the client proxy.
Standard SGX ocall/ecall communication mecha-
nism with enclaves is too slow when many calls are
needed. To solve this, we implement an exit-less mech-
anism [43] for communicating with Ops. In [43], there
is always one thread running inside an enclave listening
for operator jobs. The DBMS uses our I/O layer to send
jobs and receive replies via a communication queue. This
method greatly improves performance by avoiding con-
text switch for each call to the operator between trusted
and untrusted zones, as we discussed earlier in Section
4.2.
There are also other inherent advantages with our
design.
– When a client issues a query only involving unen-
crypted datatypes, the query processing and execu-
tion proceeds in the native way and hence with no
overheads.
– A very interesting property is that our de-
sign also allows for computations between en-
crypted datatypes and unencrypted datatypes. The
database owner here can also specify that the out-
put of such computations should be encrypted to
avoid leaking information about the encrypted in-
puts.
– Since our design implements only the primitive op-
erators, it is easy for us to implement them inside
Ops using data-oblivious methods [42] with a small
performance overhead to counter the side-channel
attacks of SGX.
5.5 Encrypting indexes
The indexed columns, unlike the other columns in the
table, need extra layers of protection. When the column
is indexed into a B-tree, for example, the structure of
the tree reveals the inequalities with respect to the val-
ues in the column even though the individual values in
the tree are encrypted. The inequalities are available
even to a snapshot adversary after index creation be-
fore any query is made to the database. We provide
two modifications to reduce this leakage. First, we re-
encrypt the individual values in the column when plac-
ing these encrypted values in an index structure. This
unlinks the connection between the values in the ta-
ble and the index. This unlinking is maintained for an
adversary obtaining only a snapshot of the table and
the indexes. Even for a slightly weaker persistent ad-
versary which does not observe the system during the
index creation, the inequalities observed from the in-
dex structure can be connected to the table values only
when a query accesses the corresponding table row as
part of its result. For an adversary persistent through-
out the index creation and usage, the security reduces
to that provided by order-revealing encryption (ORE)
[38] on the indexed columns. This change does not incur
a performance overhead during the query execution in
StealthDB.
The second change deals with this leakage on disk.
StealthDB encrypts every page that is written to the
files on disk corresponding to the indexes. We do this
by encrypting the data right before it is written to the
index files on disk, and decrypting the data read from
the index files right after it is read from disk. In our
implementation for Postgres, our changes to the code-
base involve adding three lines of code to do this task.
We create and run a fourth enclave Index_OP during the
DBMS initialization which performs the encryption and
decryption of the index data pages. And the three new
lines are for retrieving the enclave ID, calling the encryp-
tion function inside Index_OP right before a FileWrite()
of Postgres and for calling the decryption function in-
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side Index_OP right after a FileRead(). The key used for
these routines is generated and stored by Index_OP, and
Auth attests the correct loading of Index_OP during the
DBMS initialization.
5.6 Extensions
Encrypting logs
Some of the log files reveal sensitive information about
the queries even for a snapshot adversary on disk [30].
We can protect against an adversary accessing disk by
encrypting the log files on disk in a way similar to our
encryption of index files on disk. Perhaps, one could ask
why we do not encrypt every page written to disk, not
just indexes and logs. But the individual data items in
the tables are already encrypted and we get no concrete
security improvements by encrypting the individual disk
pages containing those data items.
Key management
In the current implementation, we use a single mas-
ter key K to encrypt all the data values. K is sealed
and stored on the disk by PreProcessor or Ops enclave
when obtained from Auth. If and when the system is
restarted, the enclaves are created again and a valid
PreProcessor or Ops enclave can unseal the correspond-
ing sealed components to obtain K. During this process,
the AES-GCM encryption used in the SGX sealing pro-
vides confidentiality and integrity for the sealed compo-
nent of K against any adversary. Also, when replicating
the database across multiple machines, we can let the
Auth in one of the machines to generate K and do a re-
mote attestation to transfer it to the Auth enclaves in
the other machines.
6 Security evaluation
The tradeoff between security, functionality, perfor-
mance and the intrusiveness level decided by our de-
sign results in the leakage profile that we explain in this
section.
First, we will discuss the effect of the SGX side-
channel attacks on StealthDB. SGX is subject to vari-
ous side-channel attacks as described in Section 2. The
side-channel due to the application’s page-level access
pattern is a significant one and it is up to the applica-
tion developer to design data-independent memory ac-
cesses for the application data to be secure. Our design
addresses this side-channel by performing only primi-
tive operations inside an enclave (Sections 4.2 and 5)
and by using oblivious operators [42] for these prim-
itive operations. We obviate the other software side-
channels (except the cache-based ones) by simplifying
the code inside the enclaves; running the primitive op-
erations obliviously prevents these side-channels. The
cache-based side channels [9, 15] though, are inherent
to the x86 architecture and requires patching from In-
tel. (Also, these are instances of active attacks, which
in general StealthDB does not protect against).
Now, let us discuss the leakage profile of StealthDB.
As mentioned in our threat model in Section 3.2,
StealthDB protects against semi-honest or passive ad-
versaries. It does not provide integrity guarantees to the
clients on the correctness of the query results. Neither
does it provide confidentiality guarantees against an ac-
tively malicious adversary with side-information on the
plaintext values encrypted in DB. We will first detail
the leakage profile of StealthDB for different variants
of semi-honest adversaries and through a series of secu-
rity claims we will argue that StealthDB does not leak
any more information than what is part of the leakage
profile. Our evaluation is with respect to the architec-
ture we propose, and hence independent on the specific
underlying DBMS engine.
6.1 Leakage profile
StealthDB encrypts the individual data items, rather
than an entire column or table at once, and hence this
mandates a thorough leakage profiling. We classify the
admissible adversaries as in [22] and quantify leakage
profiles during the high level operations, Init and Query,
of a DBMS for those adversaries. Init involves loading
the database in the untrusted server to be ready for
querying, and Query involves the client querying the
database to get the required results. Note that a query in
StealthDB can involve any operator supported by the
underlying DBMS (for eg., relational, arithmetic and
logical operators for a transactional DBMS).
We analyze the security of StealthDB against pas-
sive or semi-honest adversaries. We further classify the
adversaries into snapshot and persistent adversaries. A
snapshot adversary gets a snapshot to the memory of
the system whereas a persistent adversary observes the
memory of the system throughout its execution. We mo-
tivate these adversarial types in Section 3.2. A formal
security definition is provided in Appendix A.1.
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Let DB denote the database that we try to securely
operate. DB includes all the data structures used by a
database (for eg., tables, indexes, views, foreign tables)
along with their contents. We will now define the leak-
age entities to understand the security of StealthDB.
To understand the security of our system, we study the
leakage profile during different phases of database ex-
ecution: during the steady state and query execution.
The leakage entities of interest to StealthDB are as fol-
lows:
– Let St indicate the shape of the database at time4
t ≥ 0 which includes
– the database schema,
– the shape of the tables and (database) views i.e.,
the number of rows and columns in the tables
and views,
– the shape of the indexes (for eg. the shape of a
B-tree index reveals the number of keys in each
internal node of the tree).
More importantly, St does not include the contents
of any of the data structures in the database. This
entity varies with time depending on the queries run
on DB.
– Let Q denote the leakage associated with a query
execution. In StealthDB, Q is upper bounded by the
union of the plaintext outputs of the Ops enclave
invocations.
– LetMt denote the leakage associated with the logs
and the miscellaneous data structures maintained
by a DBMS at time t to aid in its operations (includ-
ing various profiling activities and recovery from un-
expected failures).
In StealthDB, the entities Q and M are dependent on
the underlying DBMS that StealthDB builds on. In Sec-
tion B, we discuss the information that can be inferred
from S, Q and M for some real-world data structures
and queries.
Note that S, Q andM are leakages with respect to
DB. We now define the leakage entity q with respect
to a query. In StealthDB, before the query is executed
(after output by PreProcessor), the query structure is re-
vealed but not the constants in the query which are en-
crypted with the semantically secure encryption. With
Q being the leakage during the execution of this query,
4 “Time” t refers to the epoch at which the data-structure is
observed or collected from the system
the total leakage of a client query to the server is upper-
bounded by the union of q and Q for this query.
– Let q indicate the leakage about the query before
the DBMS begins processing it.
Typically, q will be a subset of the DB-based leakages.
In a real-world DBMS, qmight just be a subset of {Mt}
since the details about input queries are usually logged
and checkpointed.
We will now argue the leakage profile of StealthDB
during different phases of its execution. All the following
claims rely on the fact that no information (other than
its length) about the key K used to encrypt the data is
revealed to an adversary (Claim A.1). We would rely on
the following security properties:
1. Remote and local attestation provided by SGX are
secure according to Section 2.
2. The confidentiality of the intermediate values of the
computation and the integrity of the computation
from SGX.
3. The confidentiality and integrity provided by the
secure channels established.
4. The confidentiality and integrity of the SGX sealing
procedure.
Init phase
StealthDB only leaks the initial shape S0 during the
Init phase. This is better than the OPE or ORE based
designs [44, 47] which leak the ‘<’ relation between all
the values in the OPE/ORE encrypted columns.
Claim 6.1. After the completion of Init and before any
call to Query is made, StealthDB leaks at most S0.
The high-level idea of the correctness of this claim is
as follows. Sim obtains S0 from the leakage oracle L
and outputs encryption of zeros according the shape
S as EDB. An adversary Adv2 that distinguishes the
simulated EDB from a real EDB will break the semantic
security of the encryption scheme.
Query phase
We will first argue the leakage of StealthDB for ad-
versaries which obtain snapshot access to the memory.
A snapshot adversary in StealthDB learns at most the
shape S and the leakage M due to the miscellaneous
information maintained at the time of the snapshot.
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M is further upper-bounded by the union of Q from
the queries executed recently. More formally, we have
the following claim. The correctness arguments for the
claims in this section are in the Appendix.
Claim 6.2. Consider a polynomial-time snapshot ad-
versary on StealthDB obtaining the snapshot at time t.
Let t′ ≤ t be the latest time epoch before t for which the
logs and miscellaneous data structures remain in mem-
ory and not written to disk. The adversary learns at
most St′ of the DB being operated and Q of the queries
executed between t′ and t. If the log items are encrypted
in memory and assuming that the size of logs do not re-
veal sensitive information, the adversary learns at most
St.
We will now argue the leakage for a persistent adversary.
A persistent adversary in StealthDB learns the plaintext
outputs of the Ops enclave invocations throughout its
observance. More formally, we have the following claim.
Claim 6.3. A polynomial-time semi-honest adversary
that has persistent access to the memory during the
StealthDB execution on a DB learns at most the shape
{St}t≥0 of DB and the query-execution associated leak-
age Q for all the queries executed, where Q is the union
of the plaintext outputs of Ops invocations during the
execution of the query.
Note that this claim implies that the miscellaneous data
structures M maintained or the parts of DB accessed
during query execution do not leak more information
than {St} and {Q} to a persistent adversary.
7 Implementation and
Performance
7.1 Implementation details
We implement StealthDB in C and C++ on top of Post-
gres 9.6 as an extension that loads new SQL functions,
encrypted data types and operators and index sup-
port methods for the encrypted datatypes. The com-
mand CREATE EXTENSION stealthdb loads the files
stealthdb.so (the main library), enclave_stealthdb.so
(part of the code which is executed in enclaves),
stealthdb.control (the version control file), stealthdb.sql
(definitions of new defined functions) into the system.
For instance, the function enc_int4_cmp in Figure 9
compares two enc_int4 values and returns {-1, 0, 1}.
Fig. 9. Example of a new function definition in stealthdb.sql
Fig. 10. Example of new defined function implementation in
stealthdb.c
The function enc_int4_cmp in Figure 10 is executed in
an enclave. We implement our query pre-parser in the
PreProcessor enclave on the server side to encrypt the
data values in queries and this design helps in avoiding
changes to the client JDBC or ODBC drivers of the sys-
tem. Our approach can be extended to other SQL-like
database using user-defined functions. Though database
systems like MySQL do not allow creating independent
extensions like Postgres to include our changes, these
changes are not intrusive and completely independent
of the improvements to the core database operations.
To protect against the side-channel attacks on SGX,
we make every operation inside an enclave oblivious by
leveraging AES-NI and CMOV instructions. The source
code of Postgres 9.6 has about 700k lines of code while
StealthDB has about 5k lines of code with 1.5k lines run
in enclaves.
7.2 Performance evaluation
To measure StealthDB’s performance, we use an Intel
Xeon E3 3.60 GHz server with 8 cores and 16 GB of
RAM. In our experiments, we measure the throughput
and latency of StealthDB using the TPC-C trace and
compare the results with an unmodified Postgres 9.6
which works with unencrypted data. The results were
obtained by averaging multiple 1000 second runs with
check-pointing turned off. We ran our experiments with
the number of clients varying from 1 to 10 and with
a single-threaded enclave used by all the client connec-
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Fig. 11. TPC-C benchmarking throughput for running under
Postgres and StealthDB with different scale factors
tions. The number of clients can be further increased if
a multi-threaded enclave is used. Our first set of experi-
ments leave the IDs in the TPC-C tables (e.g. w_id,
o_w_id, etc.) unencrypted. The tested database in-
cludes nine tables with about 10 million rows in total.
This is about 2GB of unecrypted data and when en-
crypted for StealthDB gives an encrypted database of
size 7GB.
Throughput
Figure 11 shows the throughput for the TPC-C bench-
marking for different scale factors. StealthDB incurs
an 4.7% overhead over the unmodified Postgres for
the scale factor W = 1 and around 30% overhead for
W = 16. This is sufficient for many real-world transac-
tional systems for the security advantages.
Latency
We measure the end-to-end TPC-C transaction latency
for StealthDB with the scale factor W = 16. This in-
cludes the time for our query pre-parser.
Table 1 and Figure 12 compare the median and aver-
age latency for StealthDB with the unmodified Postgres.
The 90th percentile of the latency of StealthDB system
is 7.2 milliseconds which results in a 22% overhead over
the unmodified version.
We also test the performance of StealthDB when
the IDs are encrypted with AES-CTR. That results in
about 3x throughput decrease over StealthDB with un-
encrypted IDs. And the latency is 3.6 times of that of
the version with unencrypted IDs. The IDs in the TPC-
Median
90th
percentile
PostgreSQL 1.6 5.9
StealthDB 2.8 7.2
Table 1. Latency statistics of TPC-C requests, ms
Fig. 12. Average latency and standard deviation for TPC-C re-
quests under Postgres and StealthDB.
C tables are just counters, hence encrypting them do
not offer any concrete security advantages.
8 Related Work
This section builds on the comparisons from the intro-
duction. The work most similar to ours is Cipherbase [2].
But the trusted on-premise key loading phase for ev-
ery FPGA device, and cloud operator controlled “shell”
monitor [1] inside an FPGA make FPGAs unsuitable for
being used as a trusted hardware in the cloud. In terms
of performance, [2] achieves about 10% better through-
put than ours, but they skip two TPC-C transactions
in their evaluation. Our evaluation with the complete
TPC-C benchmark finds that these two transactions
have the highest latency overheads. Similar bottlenecks
are expected for Cipherbase with FPGAs. And, as ex-
pected, we achieve much lower latency (4×) over the
FPGA implementation. TrustedDB [4] uses the IBM
secure co-processor to perform operations, but with
large portions of the DBMS engine executed inside the
trusted zone. The IBM co-processor incurs high over-
heads for transactional workloads and also, this design
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is not suitable for SGX for both security and perfor-
mance reasons as we discussed in Section 4.2.
CryptDB [47] uses a hybrid of encryption schemes
to support subset of SQL functionality. Their underly-
ing large leakage profiles often result in data compro-
mise [29, 41]. Performance-wise, [47] achieves a similar
throughput decrease as ours, but only when evaluated
with the individual queries from the TPC-C transac-
tions over a 20× smaller dataset. Arx replaces OPE
scheme with a special garbled-circuit based searching
method [46]. Garbled circuits however introduce large
computational and storage overheads.
A few works studied how to build versions of en-
crypted databases with SGX. VC3 system proposes an
architecture for analytical MapReduce jobs in cloud
settings [51]. Opaque studies how to leverage SGX to
secure distributed analytical workloads in Spark sys-
tems [56]. A concurrent work of ours, ObliDB [18], ob-
tains an oblivious database supporting both transac-
tional and analytical workloads. But, their solution in-
volves extensive changes to the underlying DBMS en-
gine, and does not scale well for transactional work-
loads. Another concurrent work, EnclaveDB [49], pro-
vides strong security guarantees against persistent and
active adversaries. However, this is achieved by placing
larger components of DBMS inside enclaves assuming
the existence of large enclaves, in the order of giga-
bytes, which is much greater than the 128 MB available
today.5 They also ignore the access pattern and other
side-channel attacks. In summary, [49] focuses on a dif-
ferent design space assuming how future trusted hard-
ware designs may look, while our work focuses on build-
ing encrypted database from standard trusted hardware
available today.
HardIDX [21] investigates how to perform range
queries obliviously over B+ tree indexes inside an en-
clave, leaking only the parts of the database accessed
per query. But, they only consider a static database,
and the client should generate the full B+ tree index
locally and store it in the server only for the querying.
We can incorporate their ideas in StealthDB if we were
to only support static databases and powerful clients.
Also, [21] just prototypes index searches, whereas we
architecture and build a complete encrypted database
system.
5 It is an open question to achieve larger enclaves efficiently
while providing security against physical attacks. SGX enclaves
use Merkle-trees for integrity which adds logarithmic overhead
to every access.
A number of works study how to load unmodi-
fied applications into enclaves [3, 6, 33, 53]. These ap-
proaches work well for applications that process small
data sizes, but do not scale well to larger workloads due
to SGX limitations. Also, increasing the complexity of
the codebase inside the enclaves aggravates the security
risks associated with SGX [36].
OSPIR-OXT [10, 11, 19], SisoSPIR [34] and BLIND
SEER [45] build encrypted database systems from
scratch with provable security guarantees for a subset
of functionality based on different cryptography tools.
There are also multitude of other works which provide
improvements over security or specific functionalities
of a database, but they are not implemented or inte-
grable with a mature DBMS. A recent systematization
work by Fuller et al. [22] provides are great summary of
the state-of-art research in encrypted database systems.
Fully homomorphic encryption [24] is another power-
ful cryptographic primitive which enables an untrusted
user to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted
data without learning any information about the un-
derlying data. But the current constructs for doing this
are very far from being practical [32]. In general, while
theoretical security of systems built based on crypto-
graphic methods can be high, the real-world security
of the system relies on the multitude of factors: cor-
rect implementations of non-trivial crypto algorithms,
meta-data contents, information in log files, etc. Hence,
it is not possible to argue their security just from the
security of the crypto protocols used.
9 Conclusion
StealthDB offers a scalable encrypted cloud database
system with full SQL query support with a modest
30% throughput decrease and ≈ 1 ms latency increase
while providing strong end-to-end security guarantees.
StealthDB can be implemented in any newer genera-
tion Intel CPUs. Supporting analytical workloads, re-
ducing the leakage profile and protecting against active
adversaries (i.e., providing integrity to the system) while
maintaining our design principles are interesting open
questions in this space. The source code of our imple-
mentation is also open-sourced.
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A Security addendum
A.1 Formal definition of security
Figure 13 provides the formal simulation security defi-
nition for an encrypted database system using trusted
hardware definition. This definition is inspired by [20]
who define simulation security for functional encryption
using trusted hardware HW. An EncDB construction is
secure if, for all admissible adversaries, there exists an
efficient Sim such that:
|Pr[Adv(RealEncDB) = 1]− Pr[Adv(IdealEncDB) = 1]| < negl(λ)
where Adv = (Adv1,Adv2). Adv1 runs the Real or the Ideal
experiment, whereas Adv2 obtains information about
the experiment from Adv1 depending on the adversar-
ial type being studied and produces the output 0 or
1. A snapshot Adv2 obtains a snapshot of the system,
when desired, from Adv1, whereas a persistent Adv2 com-
pletely observes the EncDB system while Adv1 is run-
ning the experiment. Adv1 is tasked with just running
the EncDB system; a semi-honest Adv1 will run as per
the specifications, and an actively malicious Adv1 will
run the system as desired to maximize the informa-
tion obtained by Adv2. The access to HW is treated
as an oracle as in [20] and Sim simulates the ora-
cle in the Ideal experiment. The HW oracle provides
interfaces to the enclaves used (in StealthDB, they
are Auth(),PreProcessor(encquery) and Ops({input}, op)).
When Query is invoked on a query, Sim will obtain the
leakage Q corresponding to a query from L.
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RealEncDB(1λ) : IdealEncDB(1λ) :
(K,EDB)← Init(1λ,DB) EDB← SimL(1λ)
encres← QueryHW(·)(EDB, encquery) encres← QuerySimL(·)(·)(EDB, encquery)
Fig. 13. Security definition for an encrypted database system using trusted hardware.
A.2 Security of K during StealthDB
execution
Outline. We will argue here that no information about
the master key K is revealed; also that only the permitted
clients can make the DBMS execute queries. This will
be a precursor to the leakage profile analysis in Section
6.1
Claim A.1. The confidentiality and integrity of the
master key K is ensured throughout the StealthDB ex-
ecution.
The database owner forms the root of trust as in Fig-
ure 7. The owner is involved in a remote attestation
protocol with Auth to check the correctness of the code
and the constants loaded into Auth against the publicly
available expected measurement of Auth. (The constants
loaded into Auth include the expected measurements of
PreProcessor and Ops). The master credentials for the
database is transferred to a valid Auth. And, the secu-
rity of SGX remote attestation guarantees the validity
of Auth. From this point, the trust is transferred to Auth.
Auth generates the master key K.
The master K is then transferred to the other en-
claves PreProcessor and Ops by Auth through the se-
cure channels established on top of local attestation.
The security of local attestation ensures that Auth es-
tablishes secure channels with only those PreProcessor
and Ops whose measurements match the expected hard-
coded ones. Hence, K is transferred only to the correct
instances of PreProcessor and Ops. Here, the confiden-
tiality and integrity provided by the secure channel en-
sure that no information about K except its length is
leaked to an adversary during the transfers.
Now, there are only two more operations which in-
volve K. First, when K is used to AES encrypt and de-
crypt data values, the SGX security guarantees com-
bined with the use of a data-oblivious implementation
of the AES-NI instructions ensure that no intermedi-
ate values about K are leaked. Finally, K is also sealed
and stored on the disk for later retrieval. Here, the SGX
sealing process provides confidentiality and integrity to
K.
Claim A.2. During the query execution phase, a query
which reaches the DBMS for execution satisfies the ac-
cess control policies for the client requesting the query.
The security of remote attestation also ensures that the
database owner transfers the client credentials database
only to a valid Auth. When a client proxy initiates a
connection with the DBMS, a valid Auth establishes
a session with the client only if the client has valid
credentials. Next, Auth transfers the session key sessk
(shared with the client) only to a valid PreProcessor.
This is ensured by the security of local attestation. Now,
when the client issues a query, the I/O layer relays it to
PreProcessor and PreProcessor parses the query and pro-
ceeds only if the query satisfies the access policies of this
client. Since there is no other interface for the client to
issue a query to the semi-honest DBMS, StealthDB en-
sures that the semi-honest DBMS only executes a query
from a valid client satisfying the access policies provided
by the database owner.
A.3 Correctness of Claim 6.2
Adv2 would query the snapshot of the system at time
t. Sim sets up EDB as encryption of zeros of arbitrary
shape S0 and answers the Ops queries arbitrarily till
t′. At time t′, Sim obtains St′ from L and rewrites EDB
with encryption of zeros according to St′ . For each query
run between t′ and t, Sim obtains Q from the oracle
L and answers the Ops queries accordingly. This way,
the execution of the Real and Ideal experiments and the
corresponding shapes of EDB are consistent at time t
assuming a deterministic order of execution for EDB.
We will now argue that the Real and the Ideal ex-
periments are indistinguishable. When Adv2 obtains the
snapshot of the system at time t, it obtains EDB along
with the logs and miscellaneous data structures main-
tained at time t. Given that the shape of EDB is con-
sistent between the two experiments at time t, semantic
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security ensures that a real EDB is indistinguishable
from the encryption of zeros. Logs, etc. for queries be-
fore time t′ are encrypted and written to disk. Hence,
they do not reveal any information about the data items
in DB. The logs maintained in between t′ and t are also
consistent between the two experiments and are consis-
tent.
If the logs and the other data structures are en-
crypted in memory, Sim can behave arbitrarily till t and
just rewrite EDB according to St at time t. Following
the assumption that the size of logs do not reveal sensi-
tive information, the Real and the Ideal experiments are
indistinguishable to Adv2.
A.4 Correctness of Claim 6.3
We again give the high-level idea here. During Init, Sim
obtains the shape S from the leakage oracle L and en-
crypts zeros as EDB according to S. This EDB is indis-
tinguishable from a real EDB by the semantic security of
the encryption scheme. Further, during the execution of
Query, the values in DB are only used inside the Ops en-
clave. With a deterministic execution of EDB, Sim uses
Q obtained from L to answer the plaintext outputs. For
the encrypted outputs, Sim produces encryption of ze-
ros as Ops output and this is again indistinguishable
from the encryption of the real values by the semantic
security of the encryption scheme.
B Concrete leakage profiles
The discussion above provided an upper bound on the
leakage in terms of abstract leakage entities. The def-
inition of the shape S is concrete from the definition.
But, Q and M depend on the underlying DBMS that
StealthDB builds on. We will now concretize this for the
different operations performed on encrypted data.
– Arithmetic operations: Some examples of arithmetic
operators include +, -, %, * and advanced ones like
sin, cos, log. For these operators, we provide the
same security as a fully-homomorphic encryption
(FHE) on the computation performed on individ-
ually encrypted data items. As in FHE, StealthDB
does not reveal any information to a semi-honest
adversary about the intermediate values of an arith-
metic computation involving encrypted inputs and
outputs, other than their length (as multiples of 128
for AES). Consider a simple example query from
a TPC-C transaction: update table_warehouse set
w_ytd = w_ytd + constant where w_id = constant2.
StealthDB reveals no information about the values
in the column w_ytd during the execution of this
query.
– String operations: String operations like substring
and wildcards have no leakage, other than the
length of inputs and outputs (up to a multiple of
128), with them being encrypted.
– Relational operations: A real-world DBMS uses in-
dexes to perform the relational operations like com-
parisons and joins efficiently. The Q for a query us-
ing an index, say a B-tree, includes the comparison
results of the parts of the B-tree explored by the
query. As the values in the index are re-encrypted
versions of the values in the table, the comparison
results are useful only when the corresponding val-
ues are accessed in the table. When a row becomes
part of query results, an adversary can link it to the
corresponding value in the index. From this, it can
use the Ops output history to obtain the comparison
results between the indexed value in this row with
the indexed values from the other accessed rows.
Hence, the information revealed by Q in StealthDB
is the comparison results for indexed values in the
rows accessed by the queries. In the worst case, our
leakage against persistent adversaries reduces to the
guarantees provided by ORE for the parts of the in-
dexes explored by the queries.
There is also a non-trivial information leakage to a
persistent adversary that only has access disk, and
not memory. The index pages on disk that are mod-
ified during checkpointing reveal some inequalities
within the data being inserted or modified. In Post-
gres, for instance, the index file stores data as 8 KB
pages. When a new value is inserted into the table,
only the pages that need to be changed are marked
as dirty in the memory and eventually changed on
disk.
For any other DBMS, the precise information re-
vealed by Q varies based on its query execution and
log maintenance procedures.
